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JUDICIAL CHOICE AND DISPARITIES
BETWEEN MEASURES OF ECONOMIC
VALUES©
By

DAVID COHEN* AND JACK L. KNTSCH*

An important idea, which characterizes law in society, is a reluctance to move
from the statusquo. In general, one can argue that legal institutions and legal
doctrine are not engaged in the redistribution of wealth from one party to
another. This paper explores a possible explanation for that principle. The
authors' research suggests that, across a wide range of entitlements and in a
variety of contexts, individuals value losses more than foregone gains. The
paper argues, as a matter of efficiency, that law and social policy might have
developed in a manner consistent with this valuation disparity. Furthermore,
this valuation disparity can be transformed into conceptions of fairness, and, as
a matter of fairness, legal decisions might have developed in a manner
consistent with this fairness norm. In the first part of the paper, the economic
and psychological research on the valuation disparity is described in detail.
The paper then examines a series of legal doctrines, all of which can be
explained by the valuation disparity phenomenon revealed in the experimental
data. Cohen and Knetsch conclude that the behaviour of legal institutions and
actors can be explained by thevaluation disparity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that the legal system should not move wealth from one
person to another pervades common law doctrine and reasoning. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "The general principle of our law is that
loss from accident must lie where it falls."1 Common explanations of
that position focus on the political power and class bias of those who
make legal decisions and create legal rules.
We propose an alternative interpretation of the historical truism
that "losses should lie where they fall." People value actual losses far
more than foregone gains, and thus, it is a matter of efficiency, 2 as well
as of fairness, to adopt presumptive legal rules which do not direct nonconsensual transfers of wealth. We explore the extent to which such
disparities in valuations between gains and losses have been
incorporated in legal doctrines and principles.
The following two puzzles illustrate the issue. They represent
examples of apparent irrationalityin law, which we believe are perfectly
understandable in terms of common behaviour and are probably
desirable.
Puzzle I: A seller sells an automobile to a buyer (B1), permitting
B1 to take possession of the car before payment in full. 3 The seller

1 The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 94. As we point out later, it is not as
simple as it might first appear to know where losses lie, in order to decide where they should fall. As
well, it is clear to us that the idea to which Holmes is alluding has application far beyond accidents,
and may inform our understanding of property rights, contract remedies, and regulatory policy.
2 The definition of efficiency that we employ in this paper is quite simple. A legal decision or
rule is efficient if, after its application, at least one person is better off and no one is worse off than
before. We might adopt a Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, which permits hypothetical
compensatory wealth transfers between the affected parties; whether we choose a Pareto or such a
potential Pareto superiority criterion does not matter to our thesis.
3 This puzzle is equally apparent in the treatment of sales by sellers who remain in possession
of goods. Here, sales legislation, which deals with sales by sellers in possession, generally
expropriates the interest of the first buyer only where the second buyer has received delivery of the
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reserves ownership of the car until full payment. Before full payment, B1
enters into an agreement with a sub-buyer (B2) who pays B1 a down
payment of $500 for the car, with delivery arranged for the following
day. Before delivery to the sub-buyer, the original seller discovers the
sub-sale. In a dispute between the original seller claiming ownership4 of
the car and B2, who also claims ownership, the originalsellerwill win.
A seller sells an automobile to a buyer (B1), permitting B1 to
take possession of the car before payment in full. The seller reserves
ownership of the car until full payment. Before full payment, B1 enters
into an agreement with a sub-buyer (B2) who pays BI a down payment of
$500 for the car, with immediate delivery arranged from B1 to B2. After
delivery to the sub-buyer, the original seller discovers the sub-sale. In a
dispute between the original seller claiming ownership of the car and B2,
of the car and who also claims
who in this case has taken delivery
5
ownership, the sub-buyerwins!
Puzzle II: A seller contracts with a buyer to purchase a piece of
jewellery. The buyer pays $100 as a deposit and agrees to pay $200 per
month for twelve months to pay off the purchase price of $2,500. The
buyer also agrees that, on default, the seller will be able to retain any
money that has been paid as of the date of default. The buyer defaults
after six months. The seller repossesses the jewellery and retains the
$1,300, which has been paid. If the buyer seeks to set aside the forfeiture
clause and recover the amount paid, then the buyer will only be able to
property.
4 The original seller wins because at common law the first buyer could not transfer any better
title than she or he had. Thus, the first sub-buyer could not receive any better ownership claim than
the person selling to this sub-buyer, and would lose to the original owner. See Cole v. North Western
Bank (1875), L.R. 10 C.P. 354 at 362, [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 486, 44 L.J.C.P. 233. See generally,

M.D. Chalmers, The Sale of GoodsAct, 1889 (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1905) at 57-66.
5 The outcome is produced through the operation of section 25(2) of the original English Sale
of Goods Act (U.K.), 1893, c. 71, which re-enacted with some slight modifications section 9 of the
FactorsAct (U.K.), 1889, c. 45 [hereinafter FactorsAct], However, that section only operates where

the sub-buyer obtains delivery of the goods or transferof documents of title, and thus does not protect
mere contract or ownership expectations.
We should also point out that this example suggests that Holmes's insight is equally accurate of
legislative action, at least where the legislative institution is purporting to create a framework for
contract and ownership disputes analogous to the framework established at common law.

Finally, some insight into the reasons we protect the sub-buyer who has possession of the
goods may be gained from early decisions, which refused to extend the equivalent section of the
FactorsAct, to lessees, even where the lessee had entered into a lease-option arrangement. See
Helby v. Matthews, [1895] A.C. 471,64 LJ.Q.B. 465,60 J.P. 20 (H.L.).
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do so if it would be "unconscionable for the seller to retain the money. ' 6
In the vast majority of cases, the courts will leave the money with the
seller.
A seller contracts with a buyer for the purchase of a piece of
jewellery. The buyer pays nothing down and agrees to pay $200 per
month for twelve months to pay off the purchase price of $2,400. The
buyer agrees to pay $1,300 on default to the seller as liquidated damages.
The buyer defaults, and the seller repossesses the jewellery and sues to
recover the $1,300 as liquidated damages. The liquidated damages
clause will, however, be held unenforceable where the buyer persuades
the court that the clause was intended as a penalty. In a large percentage
of the cases, the courts will refuse to enforce the clause and leave the
7
money with the buyer.
The puzzle in these examples is that the outcome differs
depending on the location of the object of the dispute. In Puzzle I, the
issue of which claimant's ownership interest is expropriated depends on
whether the sub-buyer has or has not taken delivery of the car. In Puzzle
II, the issue of the enforceability of the private damage assessment term
depends on whether the money has or has not been transferred to the
seller.
Many writers have seen the similarity between the penalty and
forfeiture cases and have argued forcefully for solutions, which would
reconcile8 the two doctrines, or which would eliminate the "illogical
distinction drawn by the existing law between penalty clauses and the

6 See Stockloser v. Johnson, [1954] 1 Q.B. 476 at 492, [1954] 2 W.L.R. 439, [1954] 1 All E.R.
630. While there is no empirical data on this point, our impression, and the impression of most
commentators, is that judicial discretion to take wealth away from the seller, and thus return monies
to the buyer, is only very rarely exercised, compared to judicial willingness to reviewpenalty clauses.
See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts,2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1984) at 341-45.
7 The distinction between the treatment of liquidated damages or penalties and forfeiture
clauses becomes even more problematic where the defendant has promised to pay a deposit, which
is subject to forfeiture on breach, and then fails to pay it. The cases are split on this third situation.
Some hold that the buyer must pay, which treats the arrangement as a forfeiture. Others hold that
the arrangement represents a penalty clause in which case, as above, the buyer does not have to pay.
See Hinton v. Sparkes (1868), L.R. 3 C.P. 161, 37 L.J.C.P. 81, 17 L.T. 600 (buyer liable for promised
amount, even though penal); Dewarv. Mintoft, [1912] 2 K.B. 373, 81 L.J.K.B. 885, 106 L.T. 763
(amount not recoverable by seller as a penalty). See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1991) at para. 8.310.
8 See Waddams, ibid.
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doctrine of forfeiture '." 9 It does not matter, of course, whether the
proponents of reform would prefer the penalty/liquidated damages
solution over the forfeiture clause solution10 or the converse. The point
is that rationality,to some reformers, means that the situations should be
treated the same way.
While the legal treatment of these cases appears anomalous, the
results reflect real and important differences in valuations of losses
relative to gains and in their judgments of fairness predicated on this
disparity. The differences in valuations of gains and losses appear to go
a long way towards explaining the rationality of the apparently illogical
puzzles presented above, and of many others as well.1 1 These puzzles
can be explained as manifestations of the idea thatpossession12 losses are
much more important than foregone gains, and the law takes such real
differences into account. In each case the legal rule treats economic
gains and losses differently, even though nominally commensurate.
These doctrines reflect powerful human sentiments:
bare expectations were less important than expectations allied to present rights,

especially rights of property. Hume and Adam Smith, for example, both said that

9 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (Toronto: Minister of the

Attorney General, 1979) at 425. Law Commission, Penalty Clauses and Forfeitureof Monies Paid
(working Paper No. 61) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975) at 51-54.
10 The Law Commission of England would prefer that both be treated like penalty clauses,
while Waddams would prefer that both be treated like forfeiture clauses. See Law Commission,

ibid.; and Waddams, supra note 7.
11 Common law judges seemingly apply Aristotelian concepts of corrective justice by restoring
parties to the position they were in prior to the wrongful act. Law as it has developed in most
common law jurisdictions implicates ideas of corrective, rather than distributive justice. Corrective
justice is a system for preserving what we have and for minimizing disruptions of feelings of loss, not
for bringing about new distributions of wealth.

Maintaining entitlements is implicit in law in three ways. First, compensation will usually be
considered in terms of remedying actual losses to plaintiffs rather than in compensating foregone
gains. Second, and more important, law will represent itself as a passive, political institution,

demanding justification for transfers of wealth from defendants to plaintiffs. Finally, judicial
discretion implicit in fact-finding, interpretation rule selection, and rule application may incorporate
concepts of fairness, which reflect the idea that losses are much more important than foregone

gains.
12 while we use the word possession to denote the critical element in these cases as well as in

the empirical studies, which we describe, we are not suggesting that a physical connection or even
legal entitlement is a prerequisite to the occurrence of the phenomenon. The reference position
from which changes are perceived as gains or losses may well depend on factors other than physical

possession.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 No. 3

expectations arising out of rights of property deserved greater protection than
expectations to something which had never been possessed. To deprive somebody of
something which he merely expects to receive is a less serious wrong, deserving of less
protection, than to deprive somebody of the expectation of continuing to hold something
13
which he alreadypossesses.

II. THE VALUATION DISPARITY
In each of the cases of judicial choices that we explore in this
paper, greater weight is given to actual out-of-pocket losses than to the
opportunity cost of foregone gains. Such asymmetries in the valuations
of gains and losses are not at all consistent with the assurances of most
economists that valuations of gains and losses are equivalent, or with
generally accepted principles of analysis based on such assumptions of
people's preferences.
There is no dispute that the economic value of both gains and
losses is measured by what people are willing to sacrifice. That is, gains
are valued by a payment measure, and losses are valued by a compensation measure. For example, Posner suggests, "[T]he economic value of
something is how much someone is willing to pay for it or, if he [or she]
has it already, how much money he [or she] demands to part with it. ''14
Similarly, Michelman suggests, "[B]enefits are measured by the total
number of dollars which prospective gainers would be willing to pay to
secure adoption, and losses are measured by the total number of dollars
which prospective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to
adoption."15
Although income effects or limits on ability to pay may cause the
two measures to differ, these are normally not a factor of any practical
importance and can safely be ignored in most applications. The
common view is that, "for many goods, services, and amenities that
command a modest fraction of the consumer's budget, the differences
between [the] ... measures are trivial."'16 Consequently, the usual advice

13 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at
428 [emphasis added).
14
R. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Law, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986) at 11.
15 F.I. Michelman, "Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of
'Just Compensation' Law" (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 at 1214.
16
A. Randall, Resource Economics (New York: Wiley, 1987) at 244.
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is that "as a practical matter it usually does not make much difference

17
which of these two approaches ... is adopted."

Common preferences and reactions to actual choices are,
however, not consistent with the assertion of equivalence between the
measures of loss and gain. Nor, it seems, are judicial reactions and
choices.
The traditional assumption of equivalence between the
willingness-to-pay and the compensation-demanded measures of value is
largely an empirical assertion that is common to both economic and
legal analysis. It is based on the behavioural assumption that people
assess gains and losses by comparing how well off they would be with
more or with less of something-for example, by comparing how they
would feel with their present wealth with how they would feel with their
present holdings plus $100; or by comparing their level of welfare with
an injury and their economic well-being without one.
New empirical evidence indicates that people evaluate gains and
losses in terms of changes from some reference position, instead of
comparing alternative end states. This evidence also indicates that they
value losses from this neutral point much more than they value gains
beyond it: "[T]he aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of
money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining
'1 8
the same amount."
Virtually all controlled evaluation tests, as well as the
commonplace reactions of people to real choices, point to large and
persistent differences between the valuation of losses and foregone gains
and do not confirm the traditional assumption that these two measures
of value are equal. Large differences were first noted in survey studies
of people's valuations of various losses of environmental assets or the
degradation of environmental quality. For example, a sample of duck
hunters said they would be willing to pay an average of $247 to save a
marsh area used by ducks, but would demand an average of $1044 to
accept the identical loss. 19 Similarly, a survey of anglers yielded a
17

S.E. Rhoads, The Economist's iew of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1985) at 125.
18 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk"
(1979) 47 Econometrica 263 at 279.
19 j. Hammack & G.M. Brown, Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic Analysis
(Washington: Resources for the Future, 1974).
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payment value of $35 and a compensation value of $100 for the loss of a
fishing area ° The disparity between the two measures of value was also
reported to vary from $43 to $120 for the loss of a fishing pier;21 from
$22 to $93 for the loss of a local postal service;22 from $21 to $101 for the
loss of a goose-hunting permit; 23 from $54 to $143 for the loss of an
opportunity to hunt elk 24 and from $40 to $833 for the loss of the
chance to hunt deer.2 5 We are not aware of any surveys reporting
equivalence between the two measures.
Later studies based on real exchange experiments have provided
more stringent tests than the earlier ones, which were based on
hypothetical survey questions. The results have been essentially the
same. Even when exchanges of real goods and actual cash payments
motivated the evaluations, the compensation demanded to give up an
entitlement far exceeded the comparable payment measures of value.
For example, people required about four times more money to give up a
lottery ticket than they would be willing to pay to acquire one.2 6 To hunt
deer in the northern United States, the values were reported to be $25
27
for the acquisition of a permit and $172 for the actual loss of a permit.
A more recent series of real exchange experiments has affirmed
the persistence of the evaluation disparities over repeated valuations,
and has eliminated the possibility that the differences might be
attributable to transaction costs or strategic behaviour on the part of
20

W.F. Sinclair, The Economic and SocialImpact of Kemano IIHydroelectricProjecton British
Columbia'sFisheriesResources (Vancouver: Fisheries and Marine Service, Department of the
Environment, 1976).
21 N.D. Banford, J.L. Knetsch & G.A. Mauser, "Feasibility Judgements and Alternative
Measures of Benefits and Costs" (1980) 11 J. Bus. Admin. 25.
22 Ibid.
23 R.C. Bishop & T.A. Heberlein, "Measuring Values of Extra-Market Goods: Are Indirect
Measures Biased?" (1979) 61 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 926.
24 D. Brookshire, A. Randall & J. R. Stoll, "Valuing Increments and Decrements in Natural
Resource Service Flows" (1980) 62 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 478.
25 R.C. Bishop & T.A. Heberlein, "Does Contingent Valuation Work?" in R.G. Cummings,
D.S. Brookshire & W.D. Schulze, eds., Valuing Environmental Goods (Totowa, N.J.: Roman &
Allanheld, 1986) 123.
26 J.L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, "Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded:
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value" (1984) 99 Q. J. Econ.
507.
27
Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 25.
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participants 2 8 The results indicate that, consistent with other evidence
and contrary to conventional assertions, people value losses much more
than gains. The differences are pervasive and large. They persist over
repeated valuations and they are not the result of inhibitions posed by
transaction costs.
An indication of the general findings is illustrated by the results
of a simple exercise involving people's actual choices between a coffee
mug and a large, four-hundred-gram chocolate bar.29 Each member of
one group of seventy-six participants was given a mug and told to keep it.
Each was then given a chance to give up the mug to obtain a chocolate
bar. A second group of eighty-seven participants was given the opposite
choice: to give up chocolate bars to obtain coffee mugs.
Traditional economics predicts that, in the absence of any
significant transaction costs, about the same proportion of participants
in each of the groups will prefer mugs to chocolate bars and will choose
accordingly. The actual results were in sharp contrast to this prediction:
89 per cent indicated a preference for the mug when initially given a
mug, and only 10 per cent revealed a similar preference for mugs when
they had to give up a chocolate bar to obtain one. The relative value of
mugs and chocolate bars varied greatly and depended on whether the
evaluation was made in terms of a gain or a loss. The mug was valued
more when it had to be given up to obtain a chocolate bar, and was
valued less when the chocolate bar had to be given up to obtain a mug.
The influence of income constraints and wealth or income effects was
entirely eliminated in the exercise, leaving the choices dependent on
individual preferences. These choices showed that gains and losses were
valued very differently.
A further test for the equivalence or non-equivalence of
valuations of gains and losses was modeled on the Coase Theorem, a
mainstay of the economic analysis of law and the basis for many legal
policy prescriptions. A major conclusion of the Coase proposition is
that, in the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects, people are
presumed to make mutually advantageous exchanges to ensure that

28 D. Kahneman, J.L Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Experimental Test of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem" (1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325.
29 J.L. Knetsch, "The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Non-Reversible Indifference
Curves" (1989) 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 1277.
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resources are put to their most valued use.3 0 "Since a receipt foregone
of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount,"31
final allocations of entitlements are assumed to be independent of initial
entitlements. "[T]he ultimate result (which maximizes the value of
production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is
assumed to work without cost." 32
The Coase Theorem test was conducted by randomly giving one
member of each of a large number of paired participants a good, a large
chocolate bar. Those participants were told it was theirs to take home or
to sell, if the person with whom they were paired made a sufficiently
attractive offer. The experiment was deliberately arranged so that the
potential buyers had been given a larger windfall sum of money than the
sellers. Despite this effort to encourage buyers to use their
unanticipated gain to make larger offers to acquire the goods, few
transactions were concluded. 33 In spite of the entitlements' random
distribution, the people holding them demanded much more to give
them up than potential buyers were willing to pay to acquire them. The
valuations were not, contrary to the Coase prediction, independent of
the initial assignments of entitlements. 34
Individuals have now repeatedly been shown to exhibit
disparities between gain and loss valuations in experimental settings, as
reported by many investigators using a variety of methods to evaluate
widely varied assets. As well, people's actual behaviour in making
everyday choices increasingly has been observed to be consistent with
these findings. For example, the valuation disparity and consequent
reluctance to sell at a loss is observed in the greater volume of house
sales when prices are rising, over the number when they are falling. This
can also be observed in the smaller volume of sales of securities that
have declined in price relative to those for which prices have increased. 35
30 R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ. 1.
31

Ibid. at 7.

32

ibid. at 8.

33

Supra note 28.
34 The major efficiency implications of the valuations of gains and losses have been
demonstrated in H. Hovenkamp, "Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect" (1991) 20 J. Legal Stud.
225 at 230.
35 H. Shefrin & M. Statman, "The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers
Too Long: Theory and Evidence" (1985) 40 J. Fin. 777.
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Firms frequently are reluctant to divest themselves of plants and product
lines even though they would not consider buying these same assets, and
stock prices often rise when they do give them up.
A further illustration of the differing valuations of gains and
losses is provided by responses to recent automobile insurance
legislation in two American states. In both jurisdictions people are given
a choice between cheaper policies, which limit rights to subsequent
recovery of further damages, and a more expensive policy permitting
such actions. Importantly, the default option differs: the reduced rights
policy is offered in New Jersey unless it is given up; and full rights policy
is given in Pennsylvania unless the less expensive option is specified.
Given the minimal costs in both states of choosing either option and the
large amounts of money at issue, the results have been dramatic. At last
count over 70 per cent of New Jersey automobile owners have adopted
the reduced rights policy, but fewer than 25 per cent of Pennsylvanians
have done so36
The differing weights attached to gains and losses have also been
found to influence the judgment of what people regard as acceptable or
unfair behaviour in economic relationships. If an action is seen to
impose a loss on one party for the benefit of another, this will nearly
always be widely seen to be unfair-quite apart from whatever economic
justification might exist. For example, raising prices in response to
sudden shifts in demand is seen to benefit the seller, who has not
incurred any cost increase, at the expense of the buyer and is, therefore,
judged to be unfair. Similarly, cutting wages when unemployment
increases is thought to be unfair by the vast majority of people because
the employer benefits in direct proportion to the worker's loss. As a less
aversive relinquishment of a gain, the reduction of a customary bonus
payment to workers is apparently viewed as more acceptable than an
equivalent reduction in wages, which is commonly seen as imposing a
loss on workers 37
Raising rents of a new, as opposed to a sitting, tenant or cutting
wages of a new, rather than an old, employee is generally considered to
be fair because the benefit to the landlord or the employer is not seen to
36 j. Meszarose et aL , Framing,Loss Aversion and Insurance Decisions (Working Paper)
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).
37

D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market" (1986) 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728.
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be gained at the expense of a loss to the other party. The evidence also
suggests a willingness of most people to back up their judgments with
sacrifices to punish unfair behaviour and reward what they take to be
fair dealings. 38 A major motivation for these judgments appears to be
that losses matter more to people than do foregone gains.
This strong intuition to value losses more than commensurate
gains, and the implications for the resolution of competing claims, was
summarized earlier by Holmes in the following terms:
It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own
for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defendyourself, howeveryou came
by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 3 -'

While there has been very little empirical work investigating this
phenomenon among legal actors, Stewart Macaulay's seminal work in
the sociology of law almost three decades ago offers some support for
the appearance of this phenomenon among members of at least one
business community when they confront legal disputes. 40 Macaulay
interviewed sixty-eight business people and lawyers representing fortyeight companies and six law firms. All but two of the companies were
engaged in manufacturing, with plants in Wisconsin. In his investigation
of dispute settlements, Macaulay began with the formal assumption that,
on breach of contract, the breaching party, the buyer, for example, would
be legally obligated to pay all of the seller's wasted expenses up to the
time of breach, plus anticipated lost profits. However, the responses of
the purchasing agents and sales personnel revealed attitudes consistent
with the experimental data discussed above. That is, they uniformly
believed that all they ought to recover or to pay in damages was an
amount representing the seller's actual expenses:

38 D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics"
(1986) 59 J. Bus. 285.
39 O.W. Holmes, "The Path of Law" (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 at 477. The only difference
revealed by the empirical evidence is that the reluctance to give up something does not necessarily
only occur after "a long time," but may well set in immediately. Once a reference position is
perceived, which leads to a change being viewed as a loss, then the valuation will respond
accordingly. See, particularly, supra note 28.
40 See "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55.
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[A]Il ten of the purchasing agents [that were] asked about cancellation of orders once
placed indicated that they expected to be able to cancel orders freely subject to only an
obligation to pay for the seller's major expenses such as scrapped steel. All seventeen
sales personnel asked reported that they often had to accept cancellation. One said "You
can't ask a man to eat paper [the firm's product] when he has no use for it." 4 1

The empirical findings discussed earlier, together with
Macaulay's evidence, suggest that people value gains and losses from
some neutral reference point or level. Losses from this reference are
commonly weighed more than gains beyond it. The reference position,
therefore, determines whether an adverse change is regarded as a loss or
as a foregone gain, and whether a positive change is treated as a gain or
as a reduction of a loss. Given the large disparities between valuations,
these differences can have significant practical impact.
III. THE DISPARITY AND JUDICIAL CHOICE
The legitimacy of the common law has largely been based on its
decentralized, ad hoc, incremental development by judges who have
little enforcement power, and who therefore respond to an intuitive, nonempirical interpretation of community mores and individual preferences.
If such interpretations underlie individual judgments, then a
phenomenon as pervasive as the valuation disparity would be expected
to be implicated, either explicitly or implicitly, in the development of
legal doctrine. Indeed, as expected, the idea that losses count more than
expected gains is encountered in an enormous range of ideas in law. 42
An important way in which the valuation disparity has been
incorporated in law is through the widespread recognition of possession
as a foundation for the declaration or recognition of legal entitlements. 43

41

IbiL at 64.

42 Other, independent, ad hoc explanations can be offered for many specific results, but the
valuation disparity alone appears uniquely robust as a consistent explanation across a wide range of
apparently independent legal issues.
43 One of the most articulate writers on the relationship of possession and the human
condition is C.B. MacPherson who, in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1962) at 3, wrote that "[t]he human essence is freedom from dependence on the
wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession." See also British Columbia Law Reform

Commission, Wrongful Interference with Goods (Working Paper No. 67) (Vancouver:
Columbia Law Reform Commission, 1992) at 21.
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The often misused expression that "possession is nine-tenths of the
law" 44 is a manifestation of judicial intuition that possession of things is
intimately connected to establishing the endowment effect, and
underlies judicial choices favouring protection against losses over
foregone gains.
Both legal writers and the designers of the empirical studies
discussed earlier have used the term possession in extremely ambiguous
ways. But regardless of one's choice of definition, it is incontrovertible
that judicial sensitivity to the notion of possession, or seisin, in English
law is deeply rooted and utterly pervasive: "In the history of our law
there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin." 45
Frederick Pollock,46 while noting that it was difficult to obtain a
consistent doctrine or consistent terminology, 47 offered several theories
48
on why judge-made common law presumes in favour of possession.
Utilitarian justifications for the protection of possession range from a
concern with reducing the risk of civil disobedience-a response to the
risk of personal injuries associated with self-help dispossession-to the
44 Historians have traced its development from Roman rather than Germanic Law. See S.S.
Peloubet, A Collection of Legal Maxims in Law and Equity, with English Translations (Littleton,
Colo.: F.B. Rothman, 1985) at 225; Sir F. Pollock & F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law:
Before the Time of EdwardI, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) at 29. In
The Corporationof Kingston-upon-Hullv. Homer, [1774] Lofft. 592, 98 E.R. 807 at 815 (K.B.), Lord
Mansfield C.J. said, "Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law." He used
the expression in a case concerning prescriptive rights where, in the absence of evidence of a crown
grant, one was presumed to exist, thus supporting a possessory title. By 1881 in Beddal v. Maitland
(1881), 17 Ch.D. 174 at 183 (H.C.), Sir Edward Fry was noting that the old saying that possession is
nine points of the law was created by a forcible entry statute, which resulted in a man in possession
being able to use force to keep out a trespasser. If a trespasser had gained possession, however, the
rightful owner could not use force to put him out, but had to appeal to the law for assistance. As
late as 1946, Wharton'sLaw Lexicon was expressing the idea as possession constituting "nine points"
of the law: A.S. Oppe, ed., Wharton'sLaw Lexicon, 13th ed. (London: Stevens, 1938) at 666. H.C.
Black, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1990) at 1164,
currently uses the phrase: "Possession is nine-tenths of the law."
45 Pollock & Maitland, ibid. at 29. See also F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possession
in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 1.
46 Both with R.S. Wright (see Pollock & Wright, ibid.) and with F.W. Maitland (see Pollock &
Maitland, ibid.).
47 Pollock & Maitland, ibid. at 44. Pollock and Maitland make the point that "so far as
concerns our own English law we make no doubt that at different times and in different measures
every conceivable reason for protecting possession has been felt as a weighty argument and has had
its influence on rights and remedies." Ibid.
48

Ibid. at 40.
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protection of ownership interests. But once again, we find references to
the natural expectation that a person should and will be allowed to keep

what he or she possesses until someone has proved a better title.49
A. Adverse possession

The rule of adverse possession provides a means by which the
user of property can successfully assert a claim of ownership over a prior
owner. Many of the cases involve mistakes on the location of
boundaries.50 Others, however, reward those who make effective use of
an asset over an owner who has effectively abandoned it.51
The advantages in efficiency of awarding titles to adverse

possessors usually include the reduction of administrative costs of
establishing rightful ownership and the encouragement to make

productive use of assets that are left unused by their owners 5 2 Posner
suggests a further advantage in efficiency of the rule of adverse
possession turning on possible differences between the valuations of
owners and possessors because of differences in the marginal value of
their wealth levels:
The adverse possessor would experience the deprivation of property as a diminution in
his wealth; the original owner would experience the restoration of the property as an
increase in his wealth. If they have the same wealth, then probably their combined utility
3
will be greater if the adverse possessor is allowed to keep the property,.

Posner chooses to interpret Holmes's views 5 4 of the disparity between

feelings of gains and losses as "a point about diminishing marginal utility

49 Ibid. at 41-43.
50 Distinctions in granting variances are commonly made between not requiring destruction of
an improvement built too close to a neighbour by mistake and proposing to do so, and between
wilfully ignoring a zoning ordinance and doing so by mistake.
51 While now largely matters of statute in most jurisdictions, the rules grew out of resolutions
favouring current users because of the difficulty of establishing old entitlements due to lost records
and fading memories. See R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott,
Foresman & Company, 1988).
52 See ibid.; W.Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York:
Academic Press, 1979).
53

R. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofLaw, 3d ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1986) at 70.

54 See Holmes, supra note 39.
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of income." 55 The evidence discussed earlier suggests instead that
Holmes's notion is a prescient articulation of the endowment effect, that
is, the disparity between the valuation of gains and losses. The reference
positions are probably such that taking away from a current user would
likely be valued as a loss, and giving back to the original owner would
likely be valued as a gain. And given the greater valuations of losses
over gains, the rule seems consistent with maximizing joint welfare, quite
apart from any concern with the diminishing marginal utility of income
or any incentives to encourage investment and use.
The potential gains depend on how well the limitations and
restrictions on length of time and behaviour needed to acquire title
reflect reference positions of the parties and their consequent views of
gains and losses. If a person makes very temporary use of a parcel of
land while the owner is absent for a short time, the reference position is
unlikely to shift, and an award of title would then be taken as a gain. If
the use continues over many years, a reasonable expectation of
continued use would probably develop so that any unexpected
termination would be viewed as a more important loss. An owner
deprived of title after a short absence would surely take this as a loss,
and the discovery that ownership extended several metres beyond an old
boundary fence would likely be regarded as a less valued gain.
The rules of adverse possession may be consistent with lowering
administrative costs and encouraging use. Neither addresses, however,
the disparate valuations-and consequent efficiency outcomes-that
depend on perceptions of gains and losses, and the specification of
requirements in terms of reference positions. A short limitation period
might well induce use of unused property. If such a specification leaves
the original owner in the domain of losses and the possessor feeling that
the title is a gain, the result is likely to be an inefficient change in which
the gain is outweighed by the loss.

55 Supra note 53. This was previously observed by R.C. Ellickson, "Bringing Culture and
Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics" (1989) 65 ChicagoKent L Rev. 23 at 38.
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B. Limitationson Recovery of Lost Profits
A second, more specific example of the operation of the
valuation disparity on judicial decisions is the reluctance of judges to
compensate for lost profits, whether the claim is framed in contract or
tort. As Adam Smith wrote: "[W]e naturally depend more on what we
possess than what is in the hands of others. A man robbed of five
pounds thinks himself much more injured than if he had lost five pounds
by a contract. '5 6 When permitting the recovery of economic losses in
tort law, this idea is reflected in the consistent distinction that judges
draw between loss by way of expenditure and failure to make gain. 57
While recovery of expenditures is sometimes permitted, recovery of
foregone gains is not. 58 Several recent decisions have explicitly
recognized the distinction. In one, Dominion Tape of CanadaLtd. v.
L.R. McDonald & Sons Ltd, 59 several bales fell from a trailer and hit a
hydro pole, cutting power to the plaintiffs plant. The plaintiff
successfully sued to recover wages paid to employees, which represented
positive outlays; but could not recover loss of profits, which were only
negative losses, consisting of a "mere deprivation of an opportunity to

56
Lectures on Justice,Police, Revenue and Arms,ed. by E. Cannan (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1896) at 131.
57 Tus in R.W.M. Dias, ed., Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 15th ed. (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell,
1982) at 32-33 and at 371-385, the authors typically offer the formal statement that recovery has
been extended to economic losses representing expenditures, but "the general rule is that loss of
profit per se is not actionable: there is a no duty-situation." Similarly, in Weller & Co. v. Foot and
Mouth DiseaseResearch Institute (1965), [1966] 1 Q.B. 569, [1965] 3 All E,R. 560, the Court held
that the loss of profit did not constitute a harm of a sort that the law would remedy, and that the
rule against recovery is independent both of negligence and foreseeability.
58 The House of Lords' decision in JuniorBooks Ltd. v. Veitchi (1982), [1983] 1 A.C. 520,
[1982] 3 W.L.R. 477 [hereinafterJuniorBooks], which might have presented a radical development
in compensation law and which permitted recovery of lost profits in a non-contractual setting, has
not been widely followed. See J.F. Clerk, Fifth Cumulative Supplement to the Fifteenth Edition, ed.
by R.W.M. Dias (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at paras. 10-14, which describes six limiting
factors on the JuniorBooks decision.

59 [1971] 3 O.R. 627, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 299 (Co. Ct.). See also MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v.
Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 294, [1977] 2 W.W.R. 717 (B.C.S.C.)
(employer may be permitted to recover actual wages paid to employees); and Ontario (A.G.) v.
Crompton (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 659, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (H.CJ.) (specific expenditure incurred in
putting out fire recoverable).
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The latter, while foreseeable, was judged as too

While lost profits are said to be recoverable in contract law, it is
difficult to defend the proposition that the expectation interest of a non-

breaching party is recognized in contract actions in the same fashion as
are actual losses. 61 As Atiyah argued, the costs of depriving a breaching
party of his or her wealth are considered by most to outweigh the
expected benefit to the non breaching party: "[lit might well be thought
by most people that the inconvenience to the promisor of being held to
his contract would be enough to outweigh the primafacie desirability of
not disappointing the promisee." 62 Fuller and Perdue in their seminal
article, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages," 63 argued that the
public interest in redressing wrongs varies directly with the type of claim
that thl complainant makes. In their eyes, it is relatively easy to justify
claims to compensation where the plaintiff is seeking return of wealth
transferred to the defendant, and almost as easy to justify claims to
compensation for actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of
the breach of contract. However, while contract law protects
expectations of gain: "[I]n passing from compensation for change of
position to compensation for loss of expectancy ... [t]he law no longer
seeks ... to heal a disturbed status quo, but ... assumes a more active role.

With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident

60 This approach received some support from Wilson J.A. as an innovative approach in

Ontario (A.G.) v. Fatehi (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 129 at 140, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 603 at 615 (C.A.), rev'd
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 536,15 D.L.R. (4th) 132.
61 Thus Hugh Collins writes that "[iun practice ... the courts rarely countenance the ... head of
damages for anticipated profits." H. Collins, The Law of Contract (London: Wcidenfcld &

Nicolson, 1986) at 181-82. See also L.E. Wolcher, "The Accommodation of Regret in Contract
Remedies" (1988) 73 Iowa L Rev. 797 at 873.

The most vocal proponent of the thesis that contract liability is based on reliance and
restoration of benefits, and thus that contract recovery should be similarly defined, is Patrick

Atiyah, who has made this point on several occasions. See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fallof Freedom
of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 763-779. See also P.S. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises
and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 193.

62 "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations," ibid. at 216. Professor Scott has more
pointedly written of the intuition that "a loss of $100.00 is more unpleasant than a gain of $100.00 is
attractive." R.E. Scott, "Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices" (1986) 59 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 329 at 335.
63 (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52 at 53-57.
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quality."64 Fuller and Perdue justify the protection of economic
expectations by explaining that the promisee's assets are actually reduced
but only in the sense that this would be understood "according to the
modes of thought which enter into our economic system." 65 Moreover,
they explain that the reason for the protection of expectations is that the
adoption of a rule, which protects foregone opportunities is, in effect,
the most effective means of encouraging reliance and thus compensating
for actual incurred losses!
In recent years, several judges have reinterpreted the application
of remoteness limitations on contract damage recovery. Remoteness
concepts are employed to place limits on damage awards by requiring
that the risk of loss be foreseeable with some degree of probability at the
time of contracting. 66 The doctrinal rules support the view that the
limiting concepts are not the same in tort as in contract, and that tort
law-employed to compensate for actual losses rather than forgone
'67
gains- imposes a much wider liability."
The valuation disparity has been explicitly recognized in H.
Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co.,68 where the Court
considered the recoverability of losses associated with the sale and
installation of a defective feed hopper. Lord Denning reinterpreted
earlier remoteness cases as establishing two distinct rules, which could
be understood as applying not to the doctrinal categories of tort and
contract, but rather to the kinds of losses for which compensation was
being sought. In the case of physical damage and actual expenses, the
injured party should be able to recover losses which are foreseeable as
resulting from a breach of contract even if, at the time of contract, there
64

]bid. at 56-57 [emphasis added].

65

Ibid.

66 The common law rules defining remoteness concepts in contract and tort are expressed in
Koufos v. C. Czamikow Ltd. (1967), [1969] 1 A.C. 350, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1491, [1967] 3 All E.R. 686
(H.L.), and Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Company (1966), [1967] 1 A.C.
617, 3 W.L.R. 498 [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 (P.C.) [hereinafter The Wagon Mound No. 2], respectively.
In the former case, all of the judges attempted to delineate the particular degree of probability with
which the parties ought to have foreseen the risk of loss resulting from the breach of contract. The
Wagon Mound No. 2 served similar purposes in the law of torts-the issue being whether the
defendant ought to be liable for all reasonably foreseeable risks regardless of their degree of
probability or whether some threshold statistical level of probability would trigger liability.
67 Lord Reid in The Wagon Mound No. 2, ibid. at 634.

68 (1977), [1978] Q.B. 791, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 990, [1978] 1 All E.R. 525 (C.A.).
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was only an extremely small probability of the loss occurring. However,
claims representing loss of profit or loss of opportunities for gain are
recoverable only if the risk of loss was contemplated as a serious
possibility or a real dangerq 9 The obvious result, whether or not one
supports Lord Denning's re-articulation of the traditional remoteness
rules, 70 is that the likelihood of recovery of losses is far greater than the
likelihood of recovery of unrealized gains.
The principle reflected in this decision-that physical injuries
and property damage should be given greater legal protection than
unrealized expected economic gains-is again consistent with the
empirical observation that people value losses more than foregone gains.
C. ContractModifications
A third area where the valuation disparity manifests itself is in
the distinctive treatment of performed and unperformed intracontractualpromises. For example, where a person promises to pay an
additional amount of money for a previously arranged contractual
performance,71 the courts have uniformly denied the promisee the right
to enforce the promise. 72 Thus, if a construction company agrees to pay
69 This idea was articulated by H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore in Causationin the Law (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1959) at 281-87. It is also explicitly recognized in some Civilian jurisdictions. For
example, the German Civil Code limits contract recovery in certain cases to the "negative" or

reliance interest, as discussed in G.E. Clos, ComparativeLaw (Littleton, Colo.: Fred B. Rothman &
Co., 1979) at 226-236. Furthermore, article 252 explicitly limits recovery of losses of particular gains
to situations where the risk is foreseeable as a probable consequence of the breach. See Germany,
The German Civil Code, trans. by I.S. Forrester, S.L. Goren & H.-M. Ilgen (South Hackensack, NJ.:
Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1975).
70 The judgment is important because he confesses that the physical injury/property damage

versus economic loss distinction operates defacto whatever formal test one accepts. See supra note
68 at 533 where he emphasizes a particular set of product liability cases in which personal injury
claims were compensated "even though [manufacturers and retailers] had not the faintest suspicion
of any trouble."
71 The same anomaly operates where a creditor promises to accept less than the full amount
owing from a debtor. At common law, the creditor could retract the promise even where the debtor
had paid the money. See Foakes v. Beer (1884), 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.). However, the Mercantile

Law Amendment Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 265, s. 16, provides that partperformance of the promise will
extinguish the obligation. Again, the distinction is simply where the money is located.
72 See GilbertSteelLtd. v. University ConstructionLtd. (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 19, 67 D.L.R. (3d)

606 (CA.).
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an additional $20,000 to ensure delivery of steel, which has already been
contracted for, the court will not enforce the promise to pay the
additional sum. However, if the construction company agrees to pay the
additional $20,000 and actually transfers the money to the steel supplier,
the promise is presumptively enforceable. The court will not order the
money to be returned unless the construction company can demonstrate
that the money was extorted from it under conditions of economic
duress. 73
The situations are indistinguishable except, again, for the
location of the money. In the first example, the court will not order the
transfer of wealth from the promisor to the promisee, preferring the
status quo. In the second example, the court will not order the return of
the wealth from the promisee to the promisor, again preferring the status
quo. There are very persuasive reasons for singling out these intracontractualpromises for special treatment. They represent very real
risks of extortion generated by reliance-based situational monopolies;
they introduce uncertainty relating to the authority to make the alleged
modification of the agreement; and they generate additional transaction
costs to contractual dispute resolution. But those reasons apply with
equal force to performed and unperformed promises. The distinction
developed in the cases is, once more, consistent with the empirical data,
which point to significant welfare losses in the case of coerced transfers
of wealth.
D. GratuitousPromises
Judges have traditionally and consistently drawn a distinction
between giving a gift to someone and promisingto do so.74 Performed
73 See R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978).
See Peter Kiewet Sons' Co. of Canadav. Eakins ConstructionLtd., [1960] S.C.R. 361, 22 D.L.R. (2d)
465; Re Municipal Spraying & ContractingLtd. (1980) 15 B.L.R. 37, (sub nor. MunicipalSpraying
and ContractingLtd. v. Nfld.) 153 A.P.R. 91 (Nfld. T.D.) (plaintiff entitled to recover $195,000
worth of additional work performed for defendant on ground that performance was rendered in
response to threatened legal action and was not voluntary).
74 See M.A. Eisenberg, "The Principles of Consideration" (1982) 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640; M.A.
Eisenberg, "Donative Promises" (1979) 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1; and Halsbury'sLaws of England, 4th
ed., vol. 20 (London: Butterworths, 1978) para. 62 at 36: "where a gift rests merely in promise,
whether written or verbal ... it is incomplete ... and the court will not compel the intending ... to
complete and perfect it."
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gifts are enforceable; unperformed promises to give gifts are not. The
undelivered gift cases are consistent with contract doctrines; the courts
have not looked kindly on gratuitous promises 75 either at common law
or at equity, and normally the rule is that they are not enforceable. 76
The major exception to the bargain theory of consideration is the
enforcement of promises that have generated reasonable, detrimental
reliance.7"
Eisenberg classifies donative promises into three groups:
informal and not relied-upon, formal but not relied-upon, and reliedupon. 78 Judges have consistently refused to enforce those gift promises
that fall into the first and second categories. Several underlying
rationales for the non-enforcement have been examined by several
authors and various explanations have been offered. For example,
Posner argues that the rule perhaps reflects an empirical hunch that
"gratuitous promises tend to ...
[involve] small stakes" 79 and, therefore,
that the social costs of enforcing the promise will generally exceed the
utility of doing so. Swan and Reiter suggest that we are naturally
suspicious of gift promises. Because the law has provided rules for the
completion of legally enforceable gifts, we should ask ourselves why
those rules were not followed and whether, in fact, the donor really
intended to complete the gift.80

75 Gratuitous or donative promises are those given without the exchange of something of
value, whether it be tangible property or another promise. Curriev. Mesa (1875), L.R. 10 Ex. 153,
23 W.R. 450; Spruce Grove v. YellowheadRegionalLibraryBoard(1982), 44 A.R. 48,143 D.L.R. (3d)
188,21 M.P.L.R. 62 (C.A.).
76 See for example, A.G. Guest,Anson's Law of Contract, 26th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984) at 82.
77 R.A. Posner, "Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law" (1977) 6 J. Leg. Stud. 411; and

C. Fried, Contractas Promise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) at 56.
78 "Donative Promises," supra note 74 at 6-11.

79 Posner, supra note 77 at 417. Posner argues that "[p]romises should not be enforced where
the enforcement cost-to the extent not borne by the promisor--exceeds the gains from
enforcement," and where the only reason for enforcement would be an increase in net social
welfare. Ibid. at 414. It would, as Posner puts it at 417, be uneconomical to enforce casual social
promises where the increment in utility to the promisor would be small if the promise were
enforceable and the legal error costs high.
80 j.Swan & B.J. Reiter, Contracts, Cases, Notes and Materials,3d ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1985) at 223; and M.D. Bayles, "Legally Enforceable Commitments" (1985) 4 L. &
Phil. 312 at 338.
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An alternative explanation points to the small welfare loss
associated with not receiving a gift, which is measured by the donee's
foregone gain of the opportunity, relative to the welfare loss associated
with depriving an existing owner of property of an entitlement, which is
measured by the owner's asking price to give it up. This explanation,
unlike the others, is consistent with the empirical data described earlier.
Thus, Eisenberg argues that "lost expectation-a special form of
disappointment-is among the least intense of injuries" and, therefore,
is not worthy of legal remedy.81 Since "lost expectation" is a foregone
gain, Eisenberg clearly reveals an intuitive awareness of the valuation
disparity and its role in understanding and predicting judicial choice. An
unperformed gift promise is not treated as a loss. The "wrench of
delivery"8 2 has not been experienced by the promisor and no real loss
has been experienced by the promisee.
A more realistic assessment of gains and losses, taking the
valuation disparity into account, would predict that gratuitous promises
that are relied upon will often be enforced because in those cases a real
loss would have been incurred.8 3 In Skidmore v. Bradford,8 4 a nephew
was promised a gift of a warehouse by his uncle who, in addition to
paying one thousand pounds towards the purchase price of five thousand
pounds, had asked the owner to amend the agreement by writing in the
nephew's name and by preparing the receipt in the nephew's name.
Before he died, the uncle paid a further five hundred pounds on the
purchase price. Since the nephew had signed the agreement to
purchase, he was held liable for it. He paid, sued the uncle's estate to
enforce the promise to give the warehouse as a gift, and won. There the
Court held that the nephew had "incurred that liability on the faith of
the representations of the testator that he would give him the.
warehouse."s
81 "Donative Promises," supra note 74 at 3. See also "The Principles of Consideration," supra
note 74 at 656 where he says that "[t]his principle can be justified on several grounds, the most
important of which is the low level of injury resulting from breach."
82 P. Mecham, "The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments" (1926) 21 Ill.
L. Rev. 341 at 348-49.
83 This is, in effect, the argument presented by P. Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts:A
FundamentalRestatement (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971).
84 (1869), LR. 8 Eq. 134.
85 Ibid. at 137.
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Article 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts8 6
represents the modern version of this position. It provides that
promises, which can reasonably be expected to induce reliance, are
binding and should be enforced through remedies "limited as justice
requires." While the cases discussing the appropriate remedy under
Article 90 are not uniform, a substantial percentage of them award
remedies limited by the promisee's reliance losses rather than expected
87
benefits.
E. OpportunisticConduct

Opportunistic conduct during contract formation and
performance may take several forms, including withholding information
during contract formation, taking advantage of ambiguities in language,
demanding performance in unintended situations, and failing to perform
in order to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Yet contract
negotiations and performance will likely take place more effectively if
trust is present and is generated by the process.88 Risks of opportunism
can be reduced by questioning the other's motives, honesty, and future
plans.s9 but it is inappropriate and probably dysfunctional to do so.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 90 (1981).

See supra note 63 at 64-65. See for example, Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.
1948); and Associated Tabulating Services v. Olympic Life Insurance Co., 414 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.
1969).
88 See R. McKean, "Economics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility" in E.S.
Phelps, ed., Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975)
29; D. Collard, Altruism and Economy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economics (Oxford: Martin
Robertson, 1978) at 12; and I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980).
By trust we mean attitudes and behaviour, which indicate that each person is willing to rely on
the other to act fairly and to take into account the other's welfare. Ian Macneil suggests that he uses
solidarity and trust as equivalents, referring to a belief in future harmonious affirmative
cooperation. See I.R. Macneil, "Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity"
(1986) 96 Ethics 567 at 572.
89 For an example of opportunistic behaviour in long-term supply contracts, see Fratelli
GardinoS.p.A. v. CaribbeanLumber Co., 587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979). (The seller claims that it is
unable to meet contract commitments due to insufficient shipping facilities. The Court finds that
facilities were available, but that the seller had chosen to use them for more profitable
engagements.)
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The treatment by the courts of one form of opportunistic
behaviour-deliberate contract breaches motivated by attempts to
capture unanticipated profitable opportunities-represents another
example of the incorporation of the valuation disparity concept into
judicial decision making. Here the valuation disparity manifests itself in
fairness norms, which track those generated by the fairness studies
discussed earlier.
One model of contract law, employed by Posner, ignores the
motives or gains of a person who breaks a contract. Whether the
contract breaker fails to perform in order to avoid losses or to generate
windfall gains is irrelevant. 90 An alternate model of contract, which
reflects the gain-loss valuation disparity, holds that motives for breach
are important, and that failing to perform in order to avoid
unanticipated expenses will be treated differently from failing to perform
in order to generate a windfall gain to the breaching party.91 Kessler,
Gilmore, and Kronman describe the "implicitly amoral" 9 2 contract
theory of Posner and Holmes, which ignores the motives for breach.
Alternatively, they argue that breaches motivated by a gain to the
contract breakerwill be treated more severely:
Many will say that [the] breach ought still to be condemned from an ethical point of view
...
The inclination to blame A will be even stronger if he has benefitted from his breach,
although B has not been harmed ...
The Holnesian view ...
seems never to have fully
overcome the resistance of common sense, which stubbornly insists that moral blame
(unlike legal liability) is not entirely a function of the consequences of an action but
93
depends, as well, upon the motives and intentions of the actor.

This second model appears to operate more consistently in
contract damage disputes. 94 Predictions, 95 both as to liability and the
90 See supra note 53 and supra note 38 at 458-62. See also Butler v. Fairclough(1917), 23
C.LR. 78 at 79; and Asanzera Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil and General Corp. (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, 89

D.L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Baud Corp.N.V v.Brook no. 2) [1979] 3 W.W.R. 93.
91 See A.S. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract(London: Butterworths, 1987)

at 252 and at 273.
92

93

Contracts,Casesand Materials,3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986) at 1067.

Ibid.

94 It may operate in many other contexts as well. For example, deliberate breach for profit

may influence judicial discretion in saying that a breach is fundamental, thus triggering judicial
review of otherwise enforceable exclusion clauses. Or, wilful breach for profit might influence
judicial interpretation of terms as conditions rather than warranties. Both choices would work to
the contract breaker's disadvantage. Perhaps the application of the mistake doctrines can be
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extent of recovery by plaintiffs, vary directly with information on the
motives for breach. In addition, the rule that "motives don't count" has
been subject to a number of decisions in which judges have explicitly
recognized that they are treating the two situations differently and have
designed damage awards deliberately to deprive the breaching parties of
the gains, which motivated their non-performance. 96
But the treatment of opportunism is more subtle than merely
awarding damages to deprive contract breakers of windfall gains. It
extends to the interpretation of facts and the discretionary application of
principles, which permit judges to incorporate fairness attitudes in their
decision making. These fairness norms, like those reflected in the
empirical studies described earlier, are associated with the distinction
between gains and losses.
The operation of fairness norms in contract law can be
demonstrated by contrasting cases in which judges respond differently,
depending on whether the otherwise similar behaviour of contracting
parties is motivated by attempts to take advantage of unexpected
opportunities or by attempts to respond to unanticipated losses.
One example of such a response might be found in the
application of promissory estoppel doctrines in contract performance
and modification. Promissory estoppel was developed by the courts in
explained by examining the motives of the person who is seeking to enforce agreements against
others who misinterpreted the word or the agreement.
95 What is surprising is that many, if not all, academics interpret the cases as supporting this
view without any data except their intuitions. Thus Kessler, Gilmore and Kronman suggest that, in
the case of wilful breach, the inclination to blame [the contractbreaker] will be even strongerif he has
benefitedfrom the breach. Supra note 92 at 1067.
96 For example, in PenarthDock EngineeringCo. v. Pounds, [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 359 (Q.B.), a
defendant refused to remove its ship from the plaintiff's dock. Even though the plaintiff did not
suffer any loss, the Court ordered the defendant to pay money to the plaintiff representing the cost
of renting the space, which it saved by not having to rent alternate space.
The cases in which judges have explicitly deprived contract-breakers of the gains generated by
breach are characterized, as the valuation disparity data would predict, by behaviour that often
represents deliberate interference with possessory or property rights of the plaintiff. Thus, in
Wrotham ParkEstate Co. v. ParksideHomes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798, [1974] 2 All E.R. 321 (Ch.),
the defendants entered into a restrictive covenant with the plaintiff, which prohibited the
construction of houses on the plaintiff's property. The defendants built several houses, which did
not diminish the value of the plaintiff's property, but were ordered to pay 5% of the 50,000 pounds
profit which they made on the construction of the houses. The damages were ordered in lieu of an
injunction to demolish the houses. The Court referred to several tort decisions, which provided for
restitutionary awards in the case of interference with the plaintiff's property; the case had been
deemed analogous to that situation. See supra note 91 at 274-75.
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an effort to protect the interests of contracting parties who rely on the
promises for which they did not bargain or representations of their
contracting parties. It is applied, as most writers admit, to avoid unjust
manipulation of legal rules and
enrichment and the opportunistic
97
ambiguous contract language.
A recent example of the application of the doctrine, which offers
insight into these underlying fairness norms, is a recent decision of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in a dispute between a landlord and a
tenant regarding the ability of the tenant to exercise an option to renew
its tenancy.9 8 The facts were straightforward. Dukes Cookies had
entered into a three-year contractual tenancy agreement with the Alma
Mater Society of the University of British Columbia. The lease included
a term which permitted Dukes to extend the lease for two years if it gave
written notice to the landlord during a specific two-month period.
During the term of the lease, Dukes and the Alma Mater Society
began negotiations for a new five-year lease. The negotiations included
discussions relating to profit-sharing arrangements and an expansion of
the leased premises. The negotiations were prolonged until after the
two-month notice period had ended. Dukes failed to give written notice
to extend the existing lease because they assumed, based on statements
made by the Alma Mater Society's principals, that they would obtain a
new five-year lease. After the expiry of the two-month notice period, the
Alma Mater Society notified Dukes that it would terminate the lease
according to its terms because Dukes had not given written notice to
extend the original lease. Dukes brought the legal action to prevent the
Alma Mater Society from enforcing the written notice provision in the
current lease.
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal decided the case in
favour of Dukes with the result that it was permitted to exercise its
option notwithstanding the expiration of the notice period. The formal
justification for the decision was the application of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. Through this doctrine, judges can protect the
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See J.A. Manwaring, "Promissory Estoppel in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1987) 10
Dalhousie hJ. 43 at 51. The common law doctrine of promissory estoppel is reflected in supra note
86. See also J.M. Feinman, "Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev.
678.
98
Re 6781427Holdings Ltd. and Alma Mater Society of University of British Columbia (1987),
44 D.LR. (4th) 257 (B.C.C.A), aff'g (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 753 [hereinafter Dukes].
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unbargained for reliance of a party to a contract where it would be
inequitable to permit the other party to retract a representation that
induced the reliance. 99 However, it is obvious from the decision that the
Court could just as easily have decided the case in favour of the landlord
on either of two grounds. First, the Court could have found that no
representation was made by the landlord to the tenant regarding the
likelihood of entering into the new arrangement because the testimony
of both parties was in conflict on this ground. Also, there was
considerable authority that there must be an unequivocal and explicit
representation in order to trigger the doctrine. Second, the Court could
have found that it was unreasonable for the tenant to infer that the
notice provision would not be enforced even if the representation had
been made.
What is missing from both judgments, and yet what must have
been critical from the perspective of everyone concerned, is any evidence
explaining the abrupt reversal by the landlord of its negotiation position.
Why, one can ask, did the landlord negotiate for months as if it would
enter into an extended new lease, and then, without warning, give the
tenant notice to vacate the premises?
That is the first question that comes to the mind of many
readers, and yet is left unanswered in the reported reasons for the
decisions. Discussions with the lawyer for the defendant landlord,
however, reveal a very different picture. The lawyer indicates that the
trial judge was extremely interested in the motives for the landlord's
behaviour-an irrelevant consideration in formal terms.1 00 The motive
as described in the evidence was simple. The landlord discovered during
negotiations that the profits generated by the tenant's business far
exceeded its expectations, and had terminated negotiations in order to
open its own cookie business in the same location! What is remarkable
about the case is that neither the trial nor appellate decisions mentions
this fact. That is, the motive for the termination of the negotiations

99
The American position is not substantially different, although there is considerable debate
regarding the extent to which the promisor can be taken to be responsible for the promisee's
reliance. See supranote 86; and Feinman, supra note 97.
100 That is, the formal doctrine of promissory estoppel, which was applied to justify deciding
the case in favour of the tenant, does not include an assessment of the motive of the party who
attempts to retract a representation.
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consisted of an attempt to obtain unexpected gains at the expense of the
tenant.
The case can be interpreted as an example of judges responding
to the valuation disparity. That is, the unilateral decision by the landlord
to terminate the lease without giving the tenant the opportunity to renew
for two years generated an expected gain to the landlord at the expense of
the tenant. The decision can be seen as a reflection of judicial intuition,
consistent with the empirical data on the valuation disparity, that the
benefit to the landlord, consisting of expected profit, would be
substantially less than the harm imposed on the tenant by the eviction.
This valuation disparity gives rise to strong perceptions of unfairness
consistent with the empirical evidence indicating that when one person
zero-sum game-the transaction is
gains at the expense of another-a
101
unfair.
as
seen
overwhelmingly
A second example of judges responding to the valuation disparity
and the motive for the defendant's action is a decision on the doctrine of
commercial impracticability in Aluminum Company of America v. Essex
Group, Inc. 102 That case involved a claim for relief from contractual
obligations on the doctrinal grounds of mistake, frustration, and
commercial impracticability by the plaintiff Alcoa. Alcoa successfully
obtained judicially ordered relief from a long-term obligation to process
aluminum ore, which had turned out to be unprofitable because of
unanticipated increases in Alcoa's energy costs. The case is generally
considered remarkable for two reasons. First, the trial judge was forced
to distinguish a long line of cases, which most people interpreted as
precluding relief where the plaintiffs expected profits had failed to
materialize due to unanticipated cost increases. Second, the trial judge
did not simply relieve Alcoa from its smelting obligations, but imposed a
loss and risk-sharing modification to the contract by developing new
pricing terms to reduce the losses to Alcoa associated with the explicit
contract pricing arrangement. 03

101 See supra note 37.
102 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter Alcoa].

103 The literature on the case is voluminous, although most writers focus on issues other than
the distinction between gain and loss, which we consider in this paper. See V.P. Goldberg, "Price
Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 527; R.E. Speidel, "The New Spirit of
Contract" (1982) 2 J.L. & Com. 193; and R.E. Speidel, "Court Imposed Price Adjustments under
Long-Term Supply Contracts" (1981) 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 369.

OSGO ODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 30

NO.

3

In Alcoa, the Court explicitly recognized fairness norms as
justifying judicial choices.1 04 The problem, of course, is identifying or
articulating the content of this fairness norm. Again, as in Dukes, the
interpretation of judicial behaviour is problematic. But the judgment
includes a reference to the formally irrelevant fact that, when Essex
Group had discovered that it was in a position to own substantial
amounts of very cheap aluminum, it decided to enter the commodities
market. Instead of ordering and using the aluminum in its commercial
operations, it had sought out and entered into contracts with third
parties to sell its aluminum at current market prices and, thus, reap a
windfall gain at the expense of Alcoa. 105
Again, the implication of the judgment is consistent with judicial
sensitivity to the valuation disparity which generates perceptions of
unfairness. Essex Group was gaining a windfall profit at the direct
expense of Alcoa, a transaction consistently seen as unfair.
One cannot, of course, point to two ambiguous cases and
conclude that judges are responding to conflict only in terms of fairness
and the valuation disparity. Certainly there is little explicit recognition
of their doing so. What is required to verify the connection of law to the
fairness data, and what is obviously impossible, is to identify two
populations of cases in which all facts are identical but for the relevant
variable-the acquisition of an advantage at the direct expense of
another party. If judges are acting in this way, the outcomes in the two
groups of cases should be different. 106
104 See supra note 102 at 76, where the trial judge alludes to the idea that the contract would
not be enforced where it would be "commercially senseless and unjust." See also "The New Spirit

of Contract," ibid. at 201, referring to the courts' policing transactions "in the interests of fairness";
and S.W. Halpern, "Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for the

'Wisdom of Solomon' " (1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1123, referring to an obligation to act in good
faith and to agree to contractual adjustments in order to avoid any fortuitous advantage at the
expense of the other party.
105 Apparently, Essex Group was taking advantage of its 36.25 cents per pound price for
aluminum by selling 25 per cent of its supply in the open market at the then current market price of
73.13 cents per pound. In fact, Essex Group was underbidding Alcoa and, according to Alcoa,
taking Alcoa's customers. See Note, "Court-Imposed Modifications: Supplementing the All-orNothing Approach to Discharge Cases" (1983) 44 Ohio St. LJ. 1079 at 1089 n. 107 and n. 108.
106 Ile obvious and insurmountable problem with conducting the experiment is that the two
populations of cases do not exist. However, we are not alone in suspecting that deliberate breach
for profit is influencing the exercise of judicial discretion. For example, Swan and Reiter, in a
discussion of the dissent of Irwin J. in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109

(Okla. 1963), suggest that he is responding to deliberate decisions to break contracts and thus gain
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F. Repossession

A final example of judges developing principles consistent with
the valuation disparity consists of a series of decisions in which judges
have restricted creditors' rights to repossess delivered goods on default
by buyers prior to full payment of the purchase price. This is evident
first, in the presumptive treatment by judges of time-of-payment clauses,
where judges have consistently held that "time is not of the essence" in
regard to payment for goods.1 07 Without an explicit contract term, the
result is that sellers cannot terminate the contract and repossess goods
simply on default, and that buyers are given the opportunity to remedy
the defect and retain possession.
Second, even where time-of-payment clauses have been expressly

stated as conditions-thus apparently permitting the seller to elect to be
discharged from the contract and to repossess the goods-the courts
have developed several techniques to protect the possessory welfare of
the buyer. These include liberal doctrines of waiver108 and restrictions
on the self-help repossession tactics of sellers. 109
Third, a significant number of jurisdictions have enacted seize-orsue legislation, which precludes sellers from both repossessing goods and

suing for the purchase price.110 Finally, in many jurisdictions,
repossession is permitted only with permission of the court where the

wealth at the expense of another. See Contracts,Cases, Notes andMaterials,supra note 80 at 10.
10 7
M.G. Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 409. See also Mersey Steel
and Iron Co. v. NaylorBenzon and Co. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 434, [1881-85] All E.R. 365; and DecroWall InternationalS.A. v. Practitionersin MarketingLtd., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 361, [1971] 2 All E.R. 216
(CA.).
108 See Pantoutsosv. Raymond Hadley Corp. of New York, [1917] 2 KB. 473, [1916-17] All
E.R. Rep. 448 (the failure to object to late payment held to constitute waiver of the right to treat
timely payment as a condition).
109 For example, sellers must give buyers notice of their intention to repossess or take control
of property. See Traders Bank of Canada v. G. & I Brown ManufacturingCo. (1889), 18 O.R. 430
(Ch.); and Royal Bank of Canadav. Cal Glass Ltd. (1980), 22 B.C.LR. 328 (C.A). The restrictions
are described in detail in D. Paciocco, "Personal Property Security Act Repossession: The Risk and
the Remedy" in M.A. Springman & E. Gertner, eds., Debtor-CreditorLaw: Practiceand Doctrine
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) at 365. Recent statutory developments have removed the notice
requirement. See for example, The PersonalPropertySecurityAct, C.C.S.M. c. P35, s. 57.
110 See Uniform Commercial Code § 5.103; The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.
103, s. 18; Sale of Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, s. 20; and ChattelMortgageAct.,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, s. 23.
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buyer has paid more than two-thirds of the purchase price.111 This array
of judicial and legislative activity can be explained by the data on the
valuation disparity, which would predict substantial welfare losses
associated with repossession of goods from debtors on default.
Schwartz has attacked seize-or-sue legislation as being "without
coherent justification."11 2 He argues, first, that there is no evidence of
systematic underselling of repossessed goods through organized cartels;
and second, that repossession does not impose greater harms on debtors
than it creates gains for creditors. Schwartz does discuss the valuation
disparity, but unfortunately, he misses its significance in several ways.
First, in discussing the effects of repossession, he admits that the losses
associated with repossession may reflect the fact that debtors may value
the goods more than the market price. However, he then states that the
"harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly informed of the
consequences of granting security."11 That is, if the future welfare loss
were known at the time of contracting, then the debtor would either not
grant security, or would grant less and pay a higher interest rate.
Whether Schwartz is correct or not depends on when the buyer's
reference point changes, and thus when the repossession is perceived as
a loss rather than a foregone gain. If, as seems reasonable, the shift does
not take place until some time after possession of the good, then the
buyer's ability to contract ex ante is compromised.
Second, even assuming debtor ignorance of the costs of
repossession, Schwartz argues that the alleged welfare losses associated
with repossession either would not occur or would be trivial. He
acknowledges that, if debtors value the goods because they own them
and thus, if the amount they would demand to give up their goods
exceeds the amount they would pay to obtain the goods in a significant
way, then the assignment of legal rights could determine outcomes more
frequently than is commonly supposed. However, the valuation disparity
may be linked to a kind of relationship connected not to the assignment
of legal rights, but to possession. If that is so, then merely shifting
ownership will not eliminate the valuation disparity.

111 See for example, ConsumerProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87, s. 23(1).
112

A. Schwartz, "The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods" (1983) 26 J. L.

Econ. 117 at 161.
113

kid. at 140.
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Third, in assessing whether repossession generates losses, he
denies the empirical validity of claims that "creditors necessarily derive
less value from repossessed goods than debtors lose."1 14 While the
empirical studies described above do not support the proposition that
the creditors necessarily derive less value, they certainly do offer support
for the proposition that the loss to the debtor will consistently, and in a
very significant way, exceed the expected gain to the creditor.
Finally, Schwartz argues that the gain to the buyer who
purchases repossessed goods from the creditor may offset the loss to the
original buyer, and thus that repossession does not necessarily destroy
value. Again, the empirical studies discussed earlier suggest that the loss
of economic welfare measured by the original buyer's reservation price
will almost certainly exceed the gain of the second buyer.
Our conclusion, drawn from the empirical evidence described
above, is that buyers in possession will consistently value the possessed
goods significantly above the value placed on them either by
repossessing creditors or hypothetical future buyers, and the purchaser
will not generally be able to take the higher valuation into account when
contracting. Recognizing this valuation disparity offers considerable
,support for the judicial restrictions on repossession framed in common
law rules and presumptive interpretations of contract language, as well
as for the legislative restrictions on repossession adopted in many
jurisdictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertions of conventional economic practice and
the prescriptions of many critics of legal outcomes, people commonly do
not value losses the same as they value gains. The greater weight given
to losses over objectively commensurate gains appears pervasive and is a
major determinant of which actions or changes meet community
standards of being fair or acceptable and which are likely to be
considered unfair or less acceptable.
Further, legal institutions appear to reflect the same disparity
between valuations. Court decisions over a very broad array of cases

114 Ibid. at 142-43.
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seem to take account of these differences in according greater protection
of losses over foregone gains.
This greater weight given to losses in legal outcomes is not only
consistent with people's judgments of fairness and normal business
practices but, to the extent that these different weights reflect actual
valuations of welfare changes, this differential treatment in judicial
choices may also promote efficiency. Equivalent treatment of gains and
losses called for by reform proposals "to reconcile" the differences 1 5
seems not only unlikely to be adopted, but may also lead to inefficient
outcomes and may be contrary to community fairness and equity
standards.

115 Waddans, supra note 7 at 540.

